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 RESUMO 
Este artigo estuda o contexto histórico e o impacto econômico e institucional das presidências de Néstor 
Kirchner e Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (administração Kirchner-Kirchner) na Argentina. Os efeitos das 
principais políticas econômicas durante a presidência são explicados, bem como a queda dos índices de 
qualidade institucional. Os desafios de sair do populismo também são mencionados. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the historical context, and economic and institutional impact of the Néstor Kirchner’s and 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s presidencies (Kirchner-Kirchner administration) in Argentina. The effects of the 
major economic policies during their presidency are explained as well as the indices fall of the institutional quality. 
The challenges of stepping out of populism are also mentioned. 
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RESUMEN 
Este artículo estudia el contexto histórico y el impacto económico e institucional de las presidencias de Néstor 
Kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (gobierno Kirchner-Kirchner) en Argentina. Los efectos de las 
principales políticas económicas durante ese período se explican, así como la caída de los índices de calidad 
institucional. Los desafíos de salir del populismo también se mencionan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The turn of the 21st century has seen a new wave of populist governments in regions 
such as Latin American, Europe and, arguably, the United States.  Venezuela under Chavez and 
Maduro governments is the most well-known case in Latin America. However, this is hardly the 
only populist government in the region. Nicaragua with the Sandinistas, Ecuador with Rafael 
Correa, Bolivia with Evo Morales, and Argentina with the Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration also 
represent populist experiments. It may also be argued that Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff in 
Brazil also represent a case of populism. In particular, the Foro de São Paulo can be seen as the 
organization that provided political, philosophical and financial basis for the populist movement in  
Latin America. These populist experiments have produced economic as well as institutional 
deterioration. This paper offers a case study of Argentina under the populist governments of 
Néstor Kirchner (2003 – 2007) and his wife, Cristina F. de Kirchner (2007 – 2015), with particular 
emphasis on the economic and institutional deterioration during their tenure. 
It is still early to have a complete account of the populist impact on the region, since in 
many cases, populist governments are still either in office or they have only been recently 
replaced by new political movements. Nonetheless, some researches on the economic impact of 
populism can already be found by Cachanosky (2017a, 2017ba), Cachanosky and Padilla (2018a), 
Edwards (2010a), Grier and Maynard (2016) and Ocampo (2015a). This paper offers a more up-to-
date analysis of the Argentine case as well as a specific case study rather than a general 
approach to the region or the country. 
The next section discusses the issue of defining populism. Section 3 presents the 
historical setting of the rise of populism in Argentina, namely the effects of the 2001 crisis. 
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the economic and institutional deterioration under the Kirchner-
Kirchner’s administration respectively. Section 6 concludes it. 
 
1 WHAT POPULISM IS 
 
Populism is easier to identify than  to define.  It is hard to define since common features 
of populist governments are not exclusive of this type of regimes. For instance, mobilization, 
propaganda and a charismatic leader are features commonly found in populist regimes, but at 
least in principle, not exclusive of them. The economic policy of governments is also expansionary, 
where stimulus to consumption is exacerbated into an unsustainable path (DORNBUSCH; 
EDWARDS, 1990; KAUFMAN; STALLINGS, 1991; RODRIGUEZ, 2012). These Keynesian-
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inspired policies, however, are not a monopoly of populist governments either (BRESSER 
PEREIRA; DELL´ACQUA, 1991). 
A definition of populism should look at distinctive institutional characteristics rather than 
common descriptive features. Abts and Rummens (2007), Cachanosky and Padilla (2018b), and 
Weyland (2001) argue that a distinctive feature of populism is to change the legitimacy of power 
from the anonymous albeit general “rule of law” into the vague expression of “the people”. This is 
not a minor semantic change. “The people” can be redefined as politically convenient for the 
populist leader. It also allows to create a division between “us” (the victims) and “them” (the 
threat). Furthermore, since the legitimacy of the political power is coming directly from the people, 
political institutions are either a tool to be used at the discretion of the leader, or an obstacle to be 
removed. They are not what they are supposed to be, an institutional constraint against the abuse 
of power. The misuse of political institutions is legitimized by executing the will of the people, 
according to the leader’s interpretation. It is no accident that populist government shares an anti-
republic behavior. It is also no accident that populist governments share authoritarian 
characteristics of communist and fascist governments (DE LA TORRE, 2016; OCAMPO, 2015b, p. 
99). The removal of republican constraints is a chieved by a semantical confusion with democracy. 
A democratic victory on Election Day gives the leader full power. By merging the concept of 
republic into  democracy, the populist leader keeps the source of its legitimacy on “the people”, but 
he removes the institutional constraints to his power. Even though, this definition of populism 
focuses on the institutional characteristics of a government, Rode and Revuelta (2015) find that 
the loss of economic freedom is statistically correlated with populist regimes. The lack of 
institutional constraints allows populist government to become depredatory, in the sense that they 
build a wealth extractive, rather than inclusive, entity as describ ed by Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012a). 
It should also be noted that defined this way is, at least in principle, possible to observe 
a populist government with free market policies (RODRIK, 2018). Weyland (1999; 2003), for 
instance, argues that the Latin America had experience neoliberal populism. The term neoliberal is 
vague, elusive, and imprecise. However,  its more precise economic definition is associated with 
the ten recommendations of the Washington Consensus. As Cachanosky (2017bb) and Edwards 
(2010b) point out, the so-called neoliberal reforms in the region fall short from the Washington 
Consensus prescription. Since it is problematic to see a full neoliberal reform in Latin America, is it 
difficult to describe, at least these cases, as neoliberal populism. 
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2 HISTORICAL SETTING: THE 2001 CRISIS 
 
It is hard to pinpoint exactly what lead Argentina off-track of economic development. 
However, Juan D. Perón emergence as a leading political actor is usually  considered as a turning 
point. Perón’s presence in Argentine politics lasts for a number of decades, since his participation 
in a military takeover in the 1940s until his passing during his third term in 1974. Perón became an 
influential figure in Latin American populism, and it is worth noting that he was influenced by 
Benito Mussolini when he was assigned to a military position in Italy. His social programs 
expanded the welfare state beyond it sustainable limits. Perón founded the Justicialist Party (PJ 
for its denomination in Spanish) in 1947, which is still  is one of the largest political parties in 
Argentina today. It is this fiscal disequilibrium what the different governments cannot or do not 
want to correct. This structural deficit produced decades of high inflation through deficit 
monetization.1 
After decades of high inflation rates, between 1989 and 1990, Argentina suffered a 
case of hyperinflation. This scenario resulted in the breakdown of the Argentina monetary system. 
Probably more due to necessity than conviction. The new President, Carlos S. Menem (PJ), with 
the aid of Economic Minister Domingo F. Cavallo, implemented a monetary reform transforming 
the Argentine central bank into a currency board with a fixed exchange rate of one Peso for one 
U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, as Cachanosky and Ravier (2014), and Hanke (2008) point out, this was 
an heterodox type of currency board. There were two conditions of an orthodox currency board 
that the Argentinean currency board overlooked. The first one is not having a 100% reserves (net 
of dollar liabilities) backing the Argentine Peso. The second one is not following a one-to-one 
pass-through between changes in reserves and changes Peso circulation. 
During the 1990s, the government carried heavy fiscal deficits financed with debt in 
U.S. dollars. The outstanding debt increased too fast and eventually Argentina ran out of credit in 
the financial markets and through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. When  the 
credit ran out in 2001, the government decided to declare the default of the sovereign debt, 
abandon the currency board, and break the peg over reducing government spending. The 2001 
Crisis and default in, probably, the largest crisis in Argentine history. Economic activity fell by more 
                                                          
1 For a review of Argentine economic history and the peronist movement, see (CALVO, 1986a; CORTÉS CONDE, 2008; DELLA 
PAOLERA; TAYLOR, 2001; GERCHUNOFF; ROCCHI; ROSSI, 2008; GUIDO; LAZZARI, 2003a; HANKE; SCHULER, 1999; 
IRIGOIN, 1984; OCAMPO, 2015c). 
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than 10%, with the subsequent effects on unemployment and poverty rates. In 2002, inflation rate 
reached 40%. In 2003, the poverty rate was still above 50%.2 
Even before the default, the economic downturn produced the fall of Fernando de la 
Rúa’s presidency (UCR –Unión Cívica Radical- Party), who  has taken office in 1999 after 
Menem’s two terms in office. The political crisis circa 2001 was  that the four Presidents, all from 
the Justicialist (Peronist) Party, were in office between de la Rúa’s resignation in 2001 and Néstor 
Kirchner (PJ) taking office in May 2003. De la Rúa’s resigns  on December 20th, 2001. He is 
replaced by Ramón Puerta (PJ) for a period of two days, after  Adolfo Rodriguez Saá (PJ)(who 
takes office on December 22nd ). It is Rodriguez Saá who declares the default. He was in office 
only for one week, being forced to step down from the presidency on December 30th. Finally,  on 
January 2nd, Eduardo Duhalde (PJ) is appointed President by the Congress with the mandate to 
finish de la Rúa’s term and call new elections. Duhalde breaks the currency board and the peg 
and swaps the U.S. dollars deposits into Pesos at an exchange rate of 1.4 Pesos per U.S. dollar, 
significantly below the market value. Withdrawal of deposits was virtually forbidden, allowing only 
for small amount of cash to leak from the banks. Due to social unrest and still facing the economic 
consequences of the crisis, Duhalde calls for early elections and turns the Presidency to Nestor 
Kirchner on  May 25th (a national holiday) 2003, before this term was due on December 10th of that 
same year. Nestor Kirchner receives a broken country, in default, after a currency crisis and with 
an increased poverty rate. A perfect scenario for a populist government to gain public support and 
carry unsustainable policies. 
 
3 THE ECONOMIC COST OF POPULISM 
 
3.1 Fiscal Policy 
 
The 2001 crisis only brought temporary relief to Argentina’s fiscal deficit. The default, 
currency depreciation, and tax increases brought surplus to the treasury (Figure 1). This surplus, 
however, starts to deteriorate immediately when Nestor Kirchner starts his presidency, falling from 
a peak of 3.1%(2003) in term of nominal GDP to 0.6% (2007). The speed in the fall of the budget 
coincides with the change of presidency from Nestor to Cristina Kirchner. Given the rapid fall in 
surplus with respect to GDP, it would be inaccurate to argue that NK was concerned with having a 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed account of the 1990s economy and the 2001 crisis, see Guido and Lazzari (2003b), Hanke and Schuler 
(2002), Kaminsky, Mati, and Choueri (2009), Lacoste (2005), and Thomas and Cachanosky (2016). 
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fiscal deficit while CFK did not. Since 1961 to 2017, there were four debt defaults and the 
“Rodrigazo” crisis3. The 2001 crisis was the only one preceded by a temporary fiscal surplus. 
 
Figure 1 - Fiscal deficit. Nation and Nation plus Provinces. 1961 – 2017 
 Source: Ministerio de Hacienda and author’s estimations (2018). 
 
When the fiscal situation worsens in 2007, the Kirchner’s administration started to 
tamper with economic indicators. The most well-known case is  the one of the official inflation 
numbers (discussed below). Fiscal numbers were also affected, albeit in a more subtle way. Inside 
the small revenue account Property Rents, the government started to include transfers from the 
central bank and the national pension fund. The central bank would transfer profits to the central 
government. The central bank profit, however, was calculated with tampered inflation numbers. 
Between 2007 and 2015, this account grew 33 times, adjusted with private estimations of inflation, 
the real growth was 5.4 times. This account went from representing 3 % to explain 10 % of total 
revenue. Without these transfers, the fiscal deficit increases 7 % in nominal terms (Figure 1 shows 
figures). 
                                                          
3 The Rodrigazo crisis is named after Economic Minster Celestino Rodrigo, who lifted price controls after a year of high inflation. 
The result was a rapid increase in prices with social unrest manifestations. Calvo (1986b) suggests that the social effects of the 
Rodrigrazo could have contributed to the Argentine guerilla movement that in turn lead to the  military government between 1976 
and 1983. 
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Yet, other two issues drove the high deficit of the Kirchner’s administration. With the 
impact of the crisis, social welfare spending expanded significantly. The inefficiency of the social 
plans is shown by the  fact that such transfers do not go down on time. If these plans were 
successful in reducing poverty, then its amount should fall. But, this is not what happened. In real 
terms, social welfare transfers increased 1.7 times between 2007 and 2015. In 2004 these 
transfers amounted for 28 % of total outlays and this number raised to 38% in 20154. 
The other variable that increased the fiscal deficit is subsidied into utility firms. To 
mitigate the impact of the crisis on families and firms, the government decided to freeze the cost of 
utilities such as water, electricity, and gas. To compensate firms for freezing prices below 
equilibrium, the government decided to increase the subsidies given to utility firms. In the year 
2000, transfers to the private sector represented 10%   of current outlays; by 2015 this number 
was 23%. In 2015, social welfare and transfers to the private sector represent 61 % of total 
spending.5 This cost structure of the Argentine central government makes it very difficult to 
succeed in reducing spending without serious fiscal, institutional, and policy reforms. The price 
control on utilities still produced another unintended consequence. The shortage of energy 
increased the imports of electricity, oil and related resources. 
It should be noted that this poor fiscal performance occurred at par of record high price 
of soy, an important export commodity in Argentina, with the record high tax pressure as well. 
Such tax pressure did not change with Cristina Kirchner, who took office in December 2007 after 
Nestor’s Kirchner’s tenure expired. The tax pressure was that, in 2008, that the agricultural sector 
and Cristina Kirchner’s administration got involved in a high-tense dispute about a tax hike on 
exports. This conflict became a key event in the Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration. Due to special 
powers given to the Presidency by Congress during the 2001 crisis, the President had the 
authority to impose tax reforms without need of Congress approval. The escalation of the conflict 
forced Cristina Kirchner to send the tax hike on exports to Congress hoping that a legislative 
approval would force the agricultural sector to put down their protests. In what it is remembered as 
one of the tensest days of the Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration, the Senate voted a tie and the 
Vice-President Julio Cobos, who also serves as the chair of the Senate, voted against the tax hike 
defying Cristina Kirchner’s wishes. The evolution of total tax pressure is showed in Figure 2. By 
the end of the Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration, Argentina had a consolidated tax pressure of 
almost 40 % of GDP. At the end of Cristina Kirchner’s second presidential term in December 2015, 
her chosen candidate loses the election against Mauricio Macri, leader of the political party 
                                                          
4 Ministerio de Hacienda. Boletín Fiscal. (2018) 
5 Ministerio de Hacienda. Boletín Fiscal. (2018) 
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Cambiemos (Let’s Change). Due to the high tax pressure, Macri was not in a position to reduce 
the fiscal deficit through tax increases. 
 
Figure 2 - Fiscal pressure. Federal, provinces, municipal, and inflation tax. 2000 – 2016 
 Source: Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto Argentino de Análisis Fiscal (IARAF) and author’s 
calculations (2017). 
 
3.2 Monetary Policy 
 
Given the size of fiscal deficit and lack of institutional constraints, the  Argentine central 
bank did not excel in independence. The central bank would openly transfer liquidity to the 
treasury. Even if inflation starts to spike in 2007, rising rates can be tracked back to 2004. The 
year of 2007 does not only coincide with a rise in inflation rates, it also coincides with the start of 
the government’s tamper of official inflation rates. The difference between the official rates and 
reality was too large to be ignored. Government threat private firms with legal prosecution in case 
their estimations were made public. Congressmen from the opposition, with their institutional 
protection, collected a number of private estimations and made them public in what became to be 
known as Congress CPI and Congress Inflation. Figure 3 shows yearly inflation rates on a monthly 
basis. A few issues warrant a comment. 
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Figure 3 - Yearly inflation and average inflation per presidency. Official and private 
estimations 
 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), National Congress, and author’s 
estimations (2018). 
 
Note first, in late 2002, the impact on the inflation rate of the 2001 crisis. After its rapid 
fall, a growing trend starts in April 2004. Official measures of inflation start to show a downward 
trend in early 2006. By the end of that same year, suspicions on the transparency of official data 
was high. Early 2007 private estimations of inflation start to be reported as a more reliable source 
of information. While official inflation rates where around 10%, except for the 2008 financial crisis 
(until 2014), private estimations where more than two times higher. 
In 2014, there is a spike in inflation rates, both official and private estimates. This 
coincides with a new methodology launched by the government. With patently tampered measures 
of inflation, the government launched a new CPI with a broader base (CPI Urbano/Urban CPI at 
the National level). As this new CPI is launched, higher inflation rates are reported. The fact that 
the higher inflation rates are not due to a better measurement of inflation, can be observed with a 
similar increase in the inflation rate reported by private firms. There is another spike on inflation 
rates at the beginning of the Cambiemos administration, in early 2016. This is due to an increase 
in the expansionary monetary policy during the last months of Cristina Kirchner’s administration. 
Before leaving office, the  Kirchner’s administration executed an expansionary policy that would 
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affect the prices after they leave office. Inflation rates fall to a similar level to the Kirchner 
administration to start rising again in early 2017. 
The tampering of official data went beyond inflation rates. The fiddling of inflation rates 
had effects on other official measures such as poverty and real GDP. It is harder in the case of 
GDP to point to an exact start date of GDP tampered data because the problem was not only 
using wrong price level data, but also quantities. According to an estimation by ARKLEMS, by 
2014, official GDP was overestimating its real value by 24 % (Figure 4). For the government, 
between 2007 and 2014, the economy grew in real terms at an average rate of 3.5-percent %. But, 
private estimations points to an average growth rate of 1.8-percent %. The booming economic of 
the Kirchner-Kirchner administration was built in a statistical effect more than on sound economic 
policy. 
 
Figure 4 - Real GDP. Official vs. private estimations. 2004 – 2014 
 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) and ARKLEMS(2017). 
 
At par of high inflation rates, the central bank managed the exchange rate letting the 
peso appreciate with respect to the U.S. dollar. The appreciated policy resulted in a loss of 
reserves through imports of goods and services, and also through import of energy. Recall that the 
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price control on utility services produced a shortage that required to be filled with imports. The loss 
of reserves became significant enough for the government to impose capital controls. While U.S. 
dollars were allowed to enter the country, they were not allowed to leave. The effect was a froze 
on the inflow of reserves. And since capital outflows could not be completely stopped, the loss of 
reserves did not stop (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 5 - Argentine central bank gross and net reserves in thousand U.S. dollars 
Net reserves: Gross reserves minus bank deposits in U.S. dollar at the central bank. 
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) and author’s estimations (2017). 
 
The figure shows the effect of the 2001 crisis and the subsequent recovery of reserves 
starting in 2003. From peak to through, the 2001 crisis resulted in a loss of 62 % of reserves, the 
fall that starts in 2011, suffers a fall of 60%. The recovery is mostly due to the high price of 
commodities exported by Argentina. This is closely tied to record high price of commodities. A 
sharp fall in early 2006 consists of full repayment to the IMF of the Argentine outstanding debt. NK 
argued, in a typical populist rhetoric, that he wanted the country to be freed from the IMF and the 
imperialist capital funds. When Martín Redrado, president of the central bank at the time, opposed, 
the issue became a high-intense political dispute between the Kirchner’s administration, the 
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central bank, and the political opposition in Congress.6 Figure 2 also shows that starting in 2011, 
the loss of reserve was larger than the loss in the 2001 crisis. 
Monetary policy during the Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration was also carried in 
another controversial way that imposed constrains to the Cambiemos administration. Starting in 
2006, the central bank starts to accept non-transferable bonds from the Treasury. The non-
transferable quality means that the central bank cannot sell these bonds in the open market. The 
asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet becomes increasingly illiquid. By the end of 2015, 
these illiquid bonds represent 35% of total assets. Other significant illiquid asset component is the 
transitory advancements to the treasury, a 18% by the end of 2015. More than 50% of the central 
bank assets are not eligible for open market operations. Furthermore, the central bank computed 
the non-transferable bonds by its nominal value, rather than by its market value. This inflated 
value results in an overestimation of the bank’s equity7. 
Given the illiquidity of the assets held by the central bank, the bank started to issue it 
own short-term bonds, the Letras del Banco Central (LEBACs). The instrument was designed 
shortly after the 2001 crisis. The use of this instrument was moderated for most of the Kirchner-
Kirchner administration. There is an increase in 2014 with Cristina Kirchner, but a mayor spike 
starts with the Cambiemos administration. 
During the Kirchner’s era, the central bank was comfortable with letting the treasury 
reduce the liquidity of its asset composition. But, when the Cambiemos administration took office, 
rather than fixing this issue, the new administration of the central bank decided to increase the 
sterilization through LEBACs. An easy way to increase the central banks liquidity could have been 
for the Treasury to swap the non-transferable bonds for transferable bonds. This way the 
Treasury’s debt would not have increased and would have allowed the central bank to sterilize its 
monetization by selling assets rather than issuing its own bonds. This became a serious issue for 
Cambiemos. The increased issuance of LEBACs increased the nominal interest rate in pesos, 
incentivizing a carry-trade against the U.S. dollar. As long as the nominal interest rate in pesos is 
higher than the expected peso depreciation (against the U.S. dollar), then investors will be willing 
to keep its position in pesos to increase their U.S. dollar earnings. This situation became 
untenable in the first half of 2018, when Argentina suffered a run against the peso (and other 
                                                          
6 Redrado (2010) recalls the political decision to cancel the debt with the IMF and the legal obstacles due to the Argentine 
unsolved default. 
7 In 2018, as part of an loan agreement with the IMF, the central bank was required to compute the non-transferible bonds with an 
estimated market price. The balue in the balance sheet fell by 23 %. This implied a 44% fall in the equity of the central bank. 
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argentine financial assets) producing a depreciation of the peso and a last moment fall to the IMF 
by the Cambiemos administration8. 
 
4 THE INSTITUTIONAL COST OF POPULISM 
 
As expected from a type of government that gets inspiration from an ideology with a 
weak approach to a robust republican framework, the institutional deterioration of Argentina 
observed during the Kirchner’s administration is significant. Argentine suffered a strong 
institutional shock with the 2001 crisis. However, besides this level effect, the Kirchner 
administration deepened the trend of institutional weakening. 
From the discussion in the previous section, it is no surprise to see a loss of economic 
freedom in Argentina. Between 2003 and 2015, Argentina percentile ranking fell from 37.8 to 2.6 in 
the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. Since 2012, Argentina ranks in the bottom-10 of 
free economies in the world9. The loss of economic freedom is so rapid during this time frame that, 
if Argentina were to start as the most free country in the world, it would only take it 26.7 years to 
fall at the bottom of the list. This means that in just one generation the economic institutional 
framework goes through a significant transformation. This new generation would have no 
experience or knowledge of what it meant to live in free market environment.  Figure 5 shows the 
evolution of the index and rank of Argentina’s economic freedom. An increase is observed during 
the 1990s reforms, followed by a sharp fall during the 2001 crisis and then a downward trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The run against the peso coincided with two other events. First, a hike in international interest rates as the Federal Reserve 
increased its Federal funds rate target. Second, a tax on LEBAC earning on non-resident become affective as well. These two 
events together (plus a loss in the central bank’s perceived independence) triggered the run against the peso.  
9 Starting from the bottom, according to Fraser’s Economic Freedom of the world index, the 10 countries with the less free 
economies in 2015 are: Venezuela, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Algeria, Argentina, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, Chad 
and Iran. 
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Figure 6 - Economic Freedom of the World index. Value and ranking. 1970 – 2015 
Source: James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall (2017); Economic Freedom of the 
World: Annual Report. Fraser Institute (2017). 
 
The institutional weakening goes beyond the economic sphere. Three out of five 
components of the World Governance Indicators show a percentile fall during both Kirchner’s 
presidencies (Table 1). The two components that show some improvement are Government 
Efficiency and Voice and Accountability. These improvements, however, should be read in the 
context of coming out from one the economic largest crisis in the Argentine history. 
 
Table 1 - World Governance Indicator percentile, 2002 vs. 2015 
 2002 2015 Difference 
Control of corruption 39.4 33.7 -5.7 
Government efficiency 47.4 50.0 2.6 
Political stability 22.2 46.2 24.0 
Regulatory quality 19.4 17.3 -2.1 
Rule of law 27.7 24.0 -3.7 
Voice and accountability 56.2 60.1 3.9 
Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. 
Source: World Governance Indicators, The World Bank. 
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A third indicator of the institutional environment during the Kirchner populist 
governments is the loss in freedom of the press. According to the World Press Freedom index, 
Argentina also fell in its percentile position from 52.1 to 48.0. Major falls press freedom, however, 
are seen under other populist governments in the region such as Bolivia (since 2006), Ecuador 
(since 2007), Nicaragua (since 2007), and Venezuela (since 1999). The populist experiment in 
Argentina did not result only on economic losses, but also on a serious institutional weakening.  
It should be noted that populism in Argentina, and the region in general, have been 
present for a long period of time. With a similar analytical framework to Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012b), García Hamilton (2006) shows that the institutions of Latin American countries were 
historically designed to extract rent, rather than be inclusive. Democratic elections were added on 
top of these extractive institutions where republican constraints are weak, and the courts of law 
work slow and erratically. The result was amix of (OLSON, 2000a) bandits; where the level of 
corruption and expropriation makes stationary bandits look like robbing bandits. 
 
5 THE CHALLENGE OF LEAVING POPULISM BEHIND 
 
Argentina has serious, serious / deep (?) economic policy problems as well as 
institutional problems. However, the common factor of most governments is that they try to solve 
the institutional problems only through economic policy. The numerous economic crisis that 
Argentina is known for suggesting that this approach is ineffective. Institutional reforms are 
difficult. For reasons discussed above, a reduction of the oversized government spending is not 
easy. However, these difficulties do not make the problems go away. 
There are three reasons that explain institutional reforms, for better or for worse. One is 
historical accidents. As many cases studied by (ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012c) goodor bad 
luck  and play an important role in the rise or fall of countries in the long-run. Another way is 
through a supply of reform. The supply side consists of policy makers and political leaders capable 
of driving a change. This type of leader does more than follow polls, they are able to lead the way. 
The third way an institutional reform can take place is through demand. This is the case when 
voters demand that policymakers carry on certain changes in policy and their institutions. If we 
accept this set of options, this means that the way ahead and out of populism of Argentina 
depends on having good luck, the presence of a political leader with significant influence, or 
change in the median voter big enough to trigger an institutional reform. 
Furthermore, the way ahead faces a number of typical public choice challenges. Voters 
are rationally ignorant, voters are subject to rational irrationality, voters are myopic, rent seeking 
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by group of interest that diffuse the cost through all population, etc. Argentina offers a case where 
a populist government was voted out of office before a total collapse of its economic system. 
Nevertheless, is still too soon to forecast the future of populism in Argentina. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Populist governments are known to develop a strong presence in the country, gain 
electoral support, but they fail in terms of economic policy and to weaken the institutional 
framework. The case of Argentina is no exception. Many Argentine scholars argue that the 
Argentine trend of falling economically behind is due to an underlying populist ideology in most of 
the political parties. While Juan D. Perón, the populist father of Argentina, is associated with the 
Partido Justicialista, his ideas impregnate most of the political spectrum. In this sense, the 
Kirchner-Kirchner’s administration is an exaggeration of the Argentine typical populist policies. 
The Argentine case also shows that, when studying the performance of populist 
government, a closer look to official statistics is warranted. Argentina’s government did not 
hesitate to tamper with official data and prosecute who dared to put the government in evidence. A 
closer look can show that what seems to be a successful policy is either in an unsustainable path 
or just a statistical effect. 
The Argentine case offers an opportunity for more focus and detailed research. On the 
institutional angle, for instance, it could be explored why populist leaders, even if democratically 
elected, are associated with high levels of corruption. In Olson (2000b) terms, why stationary 
bandits behave as if they were robbing bandits. In the area of monetary economics, Argentine 
offers the challenge that a fixed exchange rate (the convertibility of the 1990s) is correlated with a 
better economic performance than a fixed exchange rate, which arguably works as cushion from 
external shocks (CALVO; MISHKIN, 2003). The Macri administration is also facing difficulties to 
reduce inflation rates despite the formal application of an inflation target regime. Finally, how does 
the Argentina experience with inflation targeting compare with other cases as the ones studied by 
(BERNANKE, et. al., 1999). 
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